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THE SEARCH FOR A LIMITED SEARCH: 
THE FIRST CIRCUIT DENIES THE SEARCH 
OF CELL PHONES INCIDENT TO ARREST 
IN UNITED STATES v. WURIE 
Abstract: On May 17, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
United States v. Wurie held that the warrantless search of a cell phone was not 
justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment 
and was thus an illegal search. In doing so, the court declined to agree with 
other federal appeals court solutions regarding this issue; most notably, the 
Fifth Circuit’s 2007 decision in United States v. Finley and the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s 2012 decision in United States v. Flores-Lopez. This Comment argues 
that the approaches taken by courts on both sides of the issue have severe vul-
nerabilities. It also posits that, on review, the U.S. Supreme Court should 
adopt a test that limits the police search to information that can be found on 
the phone without accessing the internet. By drawing a line regarding the 
searchable information in a phone, this test provides a more effective method 
of balancing the various concerns this issue raises. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that warrantless 
searches of a defendant’s person can be legal under the Fourth Amendment 
if the searches are performed incident to an arrest.1 The advent of 
smartphones, however, has created a unique and complicated challenge to 
this well-established legal doctrine.2 With the growth and spread of ad-
vanced cell phones, courts have been forced to tackle the question of 
whether the exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition of 
warrantless searches extends to these devices.3 Although many courts have 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
(providing U.S. citizens with the right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures”). The 
search-incident-to-arrest exception is justified by concerns of police officer safety and a desire to 
prevent destruction of evidence. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
 2 See J. Patrick Warfield, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Search-Incident-to-
Arrest Exception and Cellular Phones, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 165, 166–67 (2010) (explaining 
the difficulty of adapting search and seizure law to new technology while balancing Fourth 
Amendment privacy concerns). 
 3 See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 2012) (addressing this 
question when police searched through a phone to obtain its number); United States v. Finley, 477 
F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2007) (addressing this question when police searched through an arrestee’s 
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agreed that the exception does extend to cell phones, courts have not come 
to a consensus over the justification behind such an extension.4 Further-
more, several courts have taken the opposite stance, albeit with a similar 
divergence in their reasoning.5 
In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United 
States v. Wurie, held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception did not au-
thorize the warrantless search of information on a cell phone seized from an 
arrestee’s person.6 The court decided that the preservation of evidence con-
cerns underlying the exception were too minimal to justify such an invasive 
search of a device that carries a heightened expectation of privacy.7 Like 
other courts that have confronted the issue, the First Circuit devised a 
bright-line rule that applies to any kind of search, on any cell phone.8 
Part I of this Comment introduces the development of the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment and provides the fac-
tual and procedural background to Wurie.9 Part II explores the differing ap-
proaches courts have taken in reaching conclusions regarding how the ex-
ception applies to cell phone searches.10 Finally, Part III discusses common 
vulnerabilities that appear in courts’ analyses on both sides of the issue.11 In 
                                                                                                                           
call records); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295–96 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (ad-
dressing this question when police searched through a phone’s text messages and photographs). 
 4 Compare Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 809 (analyzing the policies underlying the search-
incident-to-arrest exception—including preservation of evidence concerns—in extending the ex-
ception to the warrantless search of a cell phone), with Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60 (rejecting the 
need to conduct a more in-depth examination of the search-incident-to-arrest exception’s underly-
ing policies in extending the exception), and People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505–06 (Cal. 2011) 
(relying on the categorization of cell phones as containers in extending the exception). 
 5 Compare United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9, *12 (N.D. 
Cal. May 23, 2007) (placing cell phones under the immediate area of control branch of search-
incident-to-arrest analysis and concluding that the resulting analysis failed to justify the search), 
with Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 738 (Fla. 2013) (refusing to characterize searches of cell 
phones with traditional search-incident-to-arrest definitions and instead relying on the level of 
intrusiveness to find that the exception did not apply), and State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 
(Ohio 2011) (holding that the warrantless searches of cell phones are outside the scope of the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception because of a higher expectation of privacy accompanying the 
devices). 
 6 728 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3104 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 13-
212). 
 7 See id. 
 8 Id. (indicating that the search-incident-to-arrest exception can never justify the warrantless 
search of cell phones); see also Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (concluding that the search-incident-to-
arrest exception justifies all searches of cell phones when accompanied by a lawful arrest). But see 
Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 809 (declining to extend its ruling beyond similar facts due to the reluc-
tance to address the question of increasingly invasive phone searches). 
 9 See infra notes 13–38 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 39–64 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 65–94 and accompanying text. 
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contrast to the bright-line rules adopted by many courts—including the First 
Circuit in Wurie—this Comment posits that a more nuanced approach better 
balances the policies underlying the search-incident-to-arrest exception with 
Fourth Amendment concerns: the U.S. Supreme Court should permit war-
rantless searches of cell phones, but limit them to information that does not 
require Internet access.12 
I. LEGAL LANDSCAPE BEHIND THE SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST 
EXCEPTION AND WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES 
A. Fourth Amendment and the Development of the Exception 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of American citizens to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures against their person, homes, 
and property.13 Consequently, warrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable, unless a specific exception applies.14 One such exception is 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception, which can be conducted after a law-
ful arrest has been made.15 The current search-incident-to-arrest analysis, 
however, is a fairly recent phenomenon and is still developing.16 
The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception only applies to the extent necessary to further evidentiary and 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 82–94 and accompanying text. 
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Blane M. Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: 
Guidance from the Mischief that Gave it Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 907–09 (2010) (explaining 
that the amendment arose out of American colonial reaction to British search and seizure practice, 
including infamous writs of assistance, which granted easy access to warrantless searches of per-
son and property). Although the framers of the Constitution likely did not foresee this result, the 
Fourth Amendment has become the foundation for regulating our entire system of law enforce-
ment. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1516 (2010). 
 14 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2007) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967)). See generally id. (explaining that warrantless searches are those that are conducted 
without judicial oversight). 
 15 Gant, 556 U.S. at at 339 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). The freedom of police officers 
to conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee’s person immediately after an arrest has been a 
pillar of the American and English criminal procedure traditions. See Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (recognizing that English and American law have uniformly maintained this 
right); see also Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Inci-
dent to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 387 (2001) (describing how the exception evolved 
from a limited right, in line with the framers’ reluctance to grant discretionary authority to law 
enforcement, into today’s broader interpretation). 
 16 See George M. Deryl III, A Case of Doubtful Certainty: The Court Relapses into Search 
Incident to Arrest Confusion in Arizona v. Gant, 44 IND. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011) (highlighting 
new challenges that will develop in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and positing that recent 
decisions have created ambiguities). 
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safety concerns.17 In 1969, in Chimel v. California, the Court thus limited 
the application of the exception to the arrestee’s person or the arrestee’s 
immediate area of control.18 The Court reasoned that searches of evidence 
found on the arrestee’s person or in their immediate area of control were 
justified by concerns of officer safety and the destruction of evidence.19 Ac-
cordingly, the Court later clarified that, unlike items found on the arrestee’s 
person, items in the arrestee’s immediate area can no longer be searched 
when the items come under the exclusive control of the police.20 
Nevertheless, under some circumstances, searches incident to arrest 
can be sufficiently justified by the theoretical concerns of preservation of 
evidence and police officer protection, even if those concerns are not neces-
sarily present in fact.21 In 1973, in United States v. Robinson, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that a search incident to a custodial arrest was legal even 
without specific concerns that the arrestee posed a threat to the officers or 
that any evidence was at risk.22 In the custodial arrest context, therefore, 
justifications are presumed to be present.23 In other contexts, however, it 
may be necessary to show the existence of the justifications in fact, rather 
than merely relying on theoretical support.24 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. See generally James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing 
the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infi-
delity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1421–26 (describing the development of the pre-Chimel analy-
sis of the exception in the Supreme Court). 
 18 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
 19 Id. at 763. 
 20 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by Cali-
fornia v. Acevedo, 433 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 21 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (explaining that all custodial arrests 
would be treated alike for purposes of whether the justifications were present). 
 22 Id. at 236. In this case, the police searched a cigarette box on the arrestee’s person, which 
contained heroin. Id. at 223. The Court held that the police could always search closed containers 
found on the arrestee’s person incident to an arrest. Id. at 236. 
 23 See id. at 235. Custodial arrests include both formal arrests and “restraint[s] on freedom of 
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 
(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). For 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 opinion United States v. Chadwick did not involve a 
custodial arrest, and so there was a need to point elsewhere for justification. See 433 U.S. at 14 
(holding that a search of an arrestee’s footlocker was illegal where the locker had been in exclu-
sive police custody for an hour and a half, removing any evidentiary or safety concerns); see also 
Preston, 376 U.S. at 367 (holding that, outside of a custodial arrest, if there is no possibility that 
an arrestee could reach into an area that officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-
incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply). 
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B. Factual and Procedural History of United States v. Wurie 
In Wurie, the First Circuit confronted the issue of whether the search-
incident-to-arrest exception applies to searches of cell phones.25 On the 
evening of September 5, 2007, police arrested Brima Wurie for the suspect-
ed sale of drugs.26 When Wurie arrived at the station, but before he was 
booked, the police discovered a cell phone on his person.27 The officers 
searched through the cell phone’s call log and contacts folder to determine 
Wurie’s home phone number.28 Using that number, the officers determined 
Wurie’s address, which they then searched, finding contraband.29 
Wurie was charged with possession with intent to distribute, distrib-
uting cocaine base, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammu-
nition.30 Wurie filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result 
of the warrantless search of his cell phone.31 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts denied Wurie’s motion to suppress, concluding 
that the search of the phone number associated with the “my house” contact 
was no different than the search of other personal containers found on the 
defendant’s person.32 Thus, the court found that the search fell within the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception.33 A jury ultimately found Wurie guilty 
of all three counts and he was sentenced to 262 months in prison.34 
On appeal, a divided panel of the First Circuit reversed the denial of 
the motion to suppress, vacated Wurie’s conviction, and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.35 The court held that the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception did not authorize the warrantless search of data on a seized cell 
phone because Wurie was not a threat to an officer and there was not an 
                                                                                                                           
 25 728 F.3d at 1. 
 26 United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 728 F.3d 1. 
 27 Id. at 107. 
 28 Id. The police had noticed that Mr. Wurie’s phone was repeatedly receiving calls from a 
number classified as “my house.” Id. The officer searched through the phone’s call log and con-
tacts folder to determine the number associated with that contact. Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 105. 
 31 Id. During the search of Mr. Wurie’s apartment, the police seized 215 grams of crack co-
caine, an illegal firearm, ammunition, and drug paraphernalia. Id. 
 32 Id. at 110. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2. 
 35 Id. at 13. The First Circuit denied the government’s motion for a rehearing en banc because 
only an authoritative holding from the Supreme Court could mend the growing split amongst the 
lower courts. United States v. Wurie, 724 F.3d 255, 256 (1st Cir. 2013). On January 17, 2014, the 
Supreme Court granted the government’s writ of certiorari to review the First Circuit’s holding. 
United States v. Wurie, No. 13-212, 2013 WL4402108, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2014). 
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interest in preserving evidence on his cell phone.36 In particular, the court 
described the alternative ways in which police officers could preserve the 
evidence of an arrestee’s cell phone.37 For example, an officer could turn off 
the phone, place it in a protective enclosure, or copy the memory without 
looking at it.38 
II. THE VARYING APPROACHES TAKEN BY COURTS ON  
BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE 
Thus far, courts facing the issue of cell phone searches incident to ar-
rest have split regarding whether or not they should be allowed.39 Regard-
less of the ultimate conclusion, courts on both sides of the issue have adopt-
ed different approaches behind their decisions.40 Section A outlines the var-
ious approaches taken by courts that have upheld the warrantless searches 
of cell phones as valid searches incident to arrest.41 Section B then explores 
the various approaches taken by courts that have refused to extend the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception to warrantless cell phone searches.42 
A. The Different Reasoning Behind Courts’ Decisions to Allow  
Warrantless Searches of Cell Phone Data 
Many courts have allowed warrantless searches of cell phone data after a 
lawful arrest, but have nevertheless taken different routes in reaching that 
decision.43 Some courts apply a strict search-incident-to-arrest analysis.44 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Wurie, 728 F.3d at 12. The court reviewed the district court’s legal conclusion regarding the 
search of the cell phone de novo. Id. at 2 (citing United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 88–89 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (reviewing a lower court’s legal conclusion about a warrantless cell phone search de 
novo, while noting that factual findings would be reviewed only for clear error)). 
 37 Id. at 11. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See infra notes 43–64 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 43–64 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 43–50 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 43 Compare, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that warrantless searches of cell phones are permissible after weighing the risks of the evidence 
against the invasiveness), with United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 245 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that evidentiary concerns that generally face cell phones always justify searches), and 
Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Mass. 2012) (upholding a search of a cell phone 
due to the high probability of evidence and potential threats to that evidence). See generally Sara 
M. Corradi, Be Reasonable! Limit Warrantless Smart Phone Searches to Gant’s Justification for 
Searches Incident to Arrest, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 943, 948–51 (2013) (describing recent cases 
regarding warrantless searches of smartphones). 
 44 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that all searches of cell 
phones are always automatically justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception); see United 
States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009) (refusing to consider the invasiveness of the 
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Under this approach, a search is justified if it occurred pursuant to a lawful 
arrest.45 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Unit-
ed States v. Finley in 2007, upheld a warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell 
phone where police found several messages pertaining to the arrestee’s nar-
cotics-trafficking.46 The court held that as long as the search followed a valid 
arrest, no further justification was needed.47 
Alternatively, some courts have preferred a balancing test when up-
holding searches of cell phones.48 Most notably, in its 2012 decision of 
United States v. Flores-Lopez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit weighed threats towards the evidence and officer safety against the 
arrestee’s countervailing interest in avoiding an invasive search.49 Reason-
ing that a search for the phone’s number was only minimally invasive, the 
court found that the evidentiary concerns outweighed any infringement on 
privacy.50 
                                                                                                                           
search as a possible limitation against cell phone searches); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505–06 
(Cal. 2011) (holding that cell phones should be treated as any other container and that their search 
is automatically justified if conducted incident to arrest). 
 45 Finley, 477 F.3d at 260; Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505–06. 
 46 Finley, 477 F.3d at 260. The defendant in this case was arrested following a routine traffic 
stop, where police observed drug paraphernalia in the defendant’s van. Id. at 253–54. The cell 
phone was seized immediately upon arrest, but not searched until they arrived at the defendant’s 
residence. Id. at 254. 
 47 Id. at 259–60. In so holding, the court grouped cell phones together with any other type of 
closed container. Id. at 260. The court cited to cases that extended the exception to other types of 
containers, such as pagers or boxes, without a discussion of any differences between the types. Id. 
The court stated that the police were not limited in what they searched for as they could, “without 
any additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime.” Id. at 259–60. Since its 
2007 decision United States v. Finley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has declined 
to overrule its decision and has continually upheld warrantless cell phone searches incident to 
arrest. See United States v. Rodriguez, 702 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that subsequent 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court did not disturb its prior holding in Finley); United States v. 
Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 714 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that an officer’s search of a defendant’s cell 
phone, including text messages, was justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception). 
 48 See Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 809 (weighing the invasiveness of the search with the risks to 
the evidence before determining that the search of the phone was justified); Phifer, 979 N.E.2d at 
216 (holding that the search of an arrestee’s call list on his cell phone was justified due to the 
limited invasiveness of the search and the high probability that the phone contained evidence of 
the crime). 
 49 670 F.3d at 806. The Flores-Lopez court feared the possibility of an arrestee wiping the 
contents of a phone—either locally, by pressing a button and sending an emergency alert to a pre-
viously specified person—or remotely, through a mobile–security application. See id. at 808; see 
also Jamie Lendino, How to Remotely Disable Your Lost or Stolen Phone, PC (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2352755,00.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/UWY4-
UVR3 (listing the various methods for disabling smartphones remotely). 
 50 See Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 809. The court considered alternative methods the police 
could use to counter possible threats to preserving cell phone data, such as shutting off the phone 
or sealing off the network, but found them to be too flawed or burdensome to tip the scales in this 
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B. The Different Reasoning Behind Courts Refusing to Extend the 
Exception to Cell Phones 
Despite a majority of courts permitting the warrantless searches of cell 
phones, a small number of courts have not extended the search-incident-to-
arrest exception to cell phone searches.51 As with the majority, these courts 
have applied different reasoning to reach this conclusion.52 
One court limited the reach of the exception based on the type of in-
formation generally stored on cell phones.53 In 2007, in United States v. 
Park, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California rea-
soned that the type of information stored on a phone is different from the 
information stored on other items that could be held on one’s person, such 
as a wallet or an address book.54 Due to the type of information stored on a 
phone, the court explained that cell phones could not be considered as being 
held on the person for purposes of a warrantless search.55 Instead, the court 
characterized a phone as an item in the arrestee’s immediate area.56 Accord-
                                                                                                                           
case. Id. In so holding, the court did not explain what searches would be so invasive as to tip the 
scales in favor of the arrestee, but merely left open the possibility that such an upper limit exists. 
Id. at 810. In his dissent to the First Circuit’s 2013 United States v. Wurie decision, Judge Howard 
agreed that there could be such an upper limit and suggested that constitutional lines should be 
placed to prevent a cell phone search from going too far. 728 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2013) (Howard, 
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3104 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 13-212). 
 51 See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 
May 23, 2007); Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 740 (Fla. 2013); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 
949, 955 (Ohio 2011); see also supra notes 43–50 (discussing courts that have extended the ex-
ception to cell phone searches). 
 52 See Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (focusing on the type of information stored in the 
phone); Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 740 (weighing the privacy concerns against the evidentiary risks 
involved); Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955 (concentrating on the heightened expectation of privacy of 
cell phones). 
 53 See Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. The court noted that cell phones, unlike other objects held on the person—e.g., 
pagers or address books—contain a vast amount of personal information. Id. at *8. For example, 
individuals can record some of their “most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones 
through email and text, voice and instant messages.” Id. The court observed that the extensive 
scope of this information reached beyond the type of information that is otherwise typically car-
ried on the person, i.e., the type of information previously subject to the search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine. See id. As a result, the court held that the cell phone cannot be considered to be held on 
the person for purposes of a search-incident-to-arrest analysis. Id. at *9. 
 56 Id. at *9. Recall that the distinction between items found on the person and those found in 
the immediate area has legal significance in the search-incident-to-arrest analysis. See supra notes 
18–20 and accompanying text. For example, unlike items found on the person, items in the imme-
diate area can only be searched if they have not yet come under the exclusive control of the police. 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by California v. 
Acevedo, 433 U.S. 565 (1991). As a result, by categorizing a cell phone as an item in the ar-
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ingly, the court held that the exception did not apply because the phone was 
in the exclusive control of the police at the time.57 Although stopping short 
of excluding all warrantless phone searches, the court set a foundation upon 
which future courts could expand.58 
A second approach declines to extend the exception because of the 
perception that there is a high expectation of privacy associated with the 
modern cell phone.59 According to courts that follow this approach, this 
higher expectation of privacy is a function of modern cell phones’ features 
and the quality and quantity of information stored on them.60 
Finally, a hybrid approach weighs the heightened expectation of priva-
cy against the possible threats toward the evidence stored on a cell phone to 
conclude that the exception does not apply.61 Under this approach, courts—
including the First Circuit in Wurie—reason that the information stored on a 
cell phone is often personal information that, without the phone, is other-
wise off-limits during a search incident to arrest.62 Moreover, weighing this 
heightened expectation of privacy against the typical interests that justify 
the exception, these courts conclude that the potential threats against evi-
                                                                                                                           
restee’s immediate area, the court made it significantly easier to invalidate the search. See id.; 
Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9. 
 57 See Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *4 (reasoning that the phone was in exclusive police con-
trol because it was not searched until after the defendant was booked). It has been argued that the 
timing differences between Finley and Park—where the Finley search occurred immediately and 
the Park search occurred an hour and a half after the arrest—enabled the Park court’s different 
conclusion and limited the decision’s usefulness as a victory for privacy rights advocates. See 
Ashley B. Snyder, The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When Is Your 
Cell Phone Protected?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 170 (2011) (describing the Park analysis as 
a forerunner for other decisions, but expressing doubt as to its standing as precedent for the propo-
sition that warrantless phone searches cannot be justified by the search-incident-to arrest excep-
tion). 
 58 See Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8; see also id. (describing the line between cell phones 
and computers as “increasingly blurry”). 
 59 United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 
2008), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 564 (11th Cir. 2009); Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955.  
 60 See Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012); Smith, 920 N.E.2d 
at 955. See generally Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8 (discussing the features of a cell phone that create seri-
ous privacy concerns, including information of a highly personal nature, such as photographs, text 
messages, audio recordings, web search and browser history, bank account records, medical rec-
ords, as well as direct access to the home, via a linked camera). In the 2011 case State v. Smith, the 
Ohio Supreme Court refused to distinguish between smartphones and more conventional phones 
because it concluded that even standard phones were advancing to have features and capabilities 
that create the same privacy concerns. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954. 
 61 See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 12; Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 738. 
 62 Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8–9 (listing the personal information stored on a cell phone, including 
photographs, text messages, audio recordings, browsing history, calendar appointments, web 
search history, purchases, financial information, and medical history); Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 
738 (comparing searches of cell phones to searches of home offices with access to cabinet drawers 
and desks). 
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dence are minimal and can be easily mitigated.63 Thus, after weighing the 
respective interests, courts applying the hybrid approach hold that warrant-
less cell phone searches cannot be justified by the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception.64 
III. THE COMMON FLAWS IN THE REASONING OF BOTH SIDES AND AN 
OVERLOOKED ALTERNATIVE: THE INTERNET TEST 
A. The Flaws in the Reasoning of Both Sides 
All of the approaches that courts utilize to analyze whether the search 
incident-to-arrest-exception applies to cell phones suffer from serious flaws 
in their reasoning.65 The strict incident-to-arrest analysis, which automati-
cally applies the exception to cell phone searches incident to an arrest, fails 
to take into account the original justifications for the search-incident-to-
arrest exception.66 Attempting to justify an automatic application to cell 
phones by classifying them as containers is also problematic, as it relies too 
heavily on a narrow categorization of cell phones.67 In fact, the case law has 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Wurie, 728 F.3d at 11 (explaining that any fears about remote wiping of the phone’s infor-
mation could be mitigated by shutting off the phone, copying the phone’s contents, or placing the 
phone in a protective enclosure); Smallwood, 13 So. 3d at 740 (determining that the police could 
not have access to “the most private and personal details of an arrestee’s life” through cell phone 
searches simply because the phone can be carried in “a person’s pocket” and explaining that there 
was no actual danger of the phone’s information being remotely wiped). 
 64 Wurie, 728 F.3d at 12; Smallwood, 13 So. 3d at 740. 
 65 See Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 187, 219 (2010) (criticizing the 
courts’ attempts to adopt “‘an ill-fitting bright-line rule to the iPhone and its peers’” (quoting Ad-
am M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 46 (2008)); 
Chelsea Oxton, The Search Incident to Arrest Exception Plays Catch Up: Why Police May No 
Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Without a Warrant, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 
1219 (2010) (concluding that it is undesirable and inappropriate to apply ill-fitting bright-line 
rules that grant the police broad powers when searching advanced devices); see also Samuel J. H. 
Beutler, Note, The New World of Mobile Communication: Redefining the Scope of Warrantless 
Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 375, 396 (2013) (explaining 
that the courts, through their reliance on all-or-nothing solutions, have overlooked numerous crea-
tive solutions to this problem). See generally Gershowitz, supra, at 45–49 (detailing the shortcom-
ings of a polarized stance on this issue). 
 66 Compare Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (indicating that the justifications 
behind the search-incident-to-arrest exception are the preservation of evidence and officer safety), 
with United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying the strict approach and 
holding that all searches of cell phones are always automatically justified by the search-incident-
to-arrest exception), United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 245 (4th Cir. 2008) (same), and 
United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3104 (U.S. 
Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 13-212) (applying the hybrid approach and analyzing whether evidentiary 
concerns were present to justify searches-incident-to-arrest of a cell phone). 
 67 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009) (discussing the problems with relying heavi-
ly on a container classification). Compare Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (justifying the automatic appli-
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never made it clear that such a classification is sufficient to warrant a search 
incident to arrest.68 
Moreover, the decisions rejecting warrantless cell phone searches also 
suffer from critical weaknesses.69 Take, for example, the approach that fo-
cuses on the type of information stored on cell phones to classify a phone as 
an object in the immediate area, as opposed to on the arrestee’s person.70 
This method refuses to recognize the reality of what a cell phone is and how 
it is generally carried.71 Cell phones are small items that are usually carried 
on the person, either in pockets or handbags, rather than kept in the imme-
diate area.72 Additionally, the approach that invalidates searches because of 
the high expectation of privacy is flawed because it lumps all of the infor-
mation stored on a cell phone together.73 This approach fails to recognize 
that there are different expectations of privacy for different functions of the 
phone.74 
                                                                                                                           
cation of the search-incident-to-arrest exception in part by classifying cell phones as containers), 
with United States. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 passim (1973) (crafting a modern analysis of the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine without mentioning the necessity or sufficiency of classifying a 
searched item as a container). For example, a definition of container that includes cell phones is 
far from settled in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 
(1981) (defining a container as anything that is physically capable of holding another object); see 
also State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2011) (concluding that the traditional definition of 
container includes only objects that are capable of holding other objects). 
 68 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 345 (explaining that any rule that automatically allows the search of 
containers represents a major privacy threat). See generally Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, passim (omit-
ting any mention of a need to classify an item as a container). 
 69 See Gershowitz, supra note 65, at 45–49; Orso, supra note 65, at 219–20; Beutler, supra 
note 65, at 396. 
 70 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by Cali-
fornia v. Acevedo, 433 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Park, CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, 
at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). The distinction between a search of the arrestee’s person and the 
search of the arrestee’s immediate area is significant with respect to the timing of the search inci-
dent to arrest. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14; Snyder, supra note 57, at 168. 
 71 See Yanqing Cui et al., A Cross-Culture Study on Phone Carrying and Personalization, in 
USABILITY AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: HCI AND CULTURE 483, 483, 491 (Nuray Aykin ed., 
2007) (illustrating that most men and women carry their cell phones on their person, whether in 
trousers or bags) 
 72 See id. at 483, 491. 
 73 See Orso, supra note 65, at 187 (arguing that, because different information on phones have 
different expectations of privacy, the two types of information should be treated differently); cf. 
Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955 (holding that all cell phones have a heightened expectation of privacy 
that protects them from searches incident to arrest). 
 74 See Orso, supra note 65, at 187 (explaining that different types of information on cell 
phones carry with them different expectations of privacy); Beutler supra note 65, at 401–02 (ex-
plaining that the information found in traditional cell phone functions, such as an address book or 
call log, is of the kind commonly found in incidents to arrest, and therefore has different privacy 
expectations than the information found in nontraditional cell phone functions, such as web 
browsing or banking—which is information that is not typically found during these searches); id. 
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The balancing approach, which weighs the arrestee’s privacy interests 
against evidentiary threats, suffers from the very same flaw: it treats the 
privacy interests of all cell phone searches the same, regardless of whether 
the court interprets the test in favor of or against the warrantless search of 
cell phones.75 Because searches of cell phones vary in terms of invasive-
ness, a one-size-fits-all balancing test is inadequate.76 For example, search-
ing through a phone’s contact list is far less invasive than searching through 
medical or financial records on a phone.77 
These considerations demand a more nuanced test to determine the ap-
plicability of the search-incident-to-arrest exception to cell phone search-
es.78 Although courts on both sides have expressed that a bright-line test 
provides clarity to police officers with regard to their duties and limitations 
in the field, a bright-line test need not be all-or-nothing.79 A middle-ground 
solution can achieve clarity while respecting the privacy concerns of the 
                                                                                                                           
at 402 (explaining that advanced phone functions resemble the capabilities of computers and 
therefore carry a similar heightened expectation of privacy, unlike traditional phone functions). 
 75 See Orso, supra note 65 at 187 (explaining that varying degrees of privacy expectations 
attach to different types of cell phone information, which may lead to different Fourth Amendment 
conclusions about the legality of a search); Beutler, supra note 65, at 401 (explaining that infor-
mation associated with traditional versus nontraditional cell phone functions have differing priva-
cy expectations); cf. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8–9 (mentioning many characteristics of advanced phones, 
such as access to bank records, medical records, and home cameras—without discussing the avail-
ability of these applications on more basic phones). 
 76 See Gershowitz, supra note 65, at 45–49; Orso, supra note 65, at 187; Beutler, supra note 
65, at 401. 
 77 See Beutler, supra note 65, at 401 (“[An] appropriate test for the scope of a cell phone 
search incident to arrest should concern the function of a cell phone.”); see also Orso, supra note 
65, at 187 (explaining that information such as text messages and photographs are far more private 
than lists of recently dialed phone numbers or address books). 
 78 See supra notes 65–77 and accompanying text (discussing the bright-line approaches taken 
by courts and rejecting each approach as flawed). 
 79 See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 21 (Howard, J., dissenting) (explaining that a possible solution to 
cell phone searches can be more moderate than an all-or-nothing approach); Beutler, supra note 
65, at 396 (highlighting some of the creative possibilities that have been overlooked in favor of 
these all-or-nothing approaches); supra notes 82–94 (discussing a more nuanced approach). But 
see Wurie, 728 F.3d at 6, 12–13 (majority opinion) (highlighting that a bright-line test provides 
clarity); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012) (same). The courts’ fear 
of a more nuanced position stems from the concern that it would be too difficult for police to im-
plement in the field. See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 6, 12–13 (expressing distaste for highly subjective and 
fact-specific rules because of their inherent difficulty for officers to apply); Beutler, supra note 65, 
at 401 (explaining that the best rule for searches of cell phones incident to arrest requires simplici-
ty for police in the field). 
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arrestee.80 Moreover, a middle-ground solution avoids the flaws common to 
both extremes.81 
B. The Internet Test 
Drawing the line at information that is available without accessing the 
Internet creates an easy rule while safeguarding the privacy concerns of the 
arrestee.82 Under this approach, the phone’s contact list, photos, call log, 
and text messages would be searchable by the police, whereas e-mail, 
browsing history, and most mobile applications would not.83 
The Supreme Court should adopt this bright-line rule, which addresses 
both the privacy and evidentiary concerns raised by cell phone searches.84 
The test is not difficult for police to implement.85 Police can easily deter-
mine when an application requires online functionality by disabling the 
phone’s Internet access.86 Moreover, this test protects the arrestee’s privacy 
concerns.87 It leaves accessible the kind of information that the search-
incident-to-arrest exception has traditionally left available to police, but 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 21 (Howard, J., dissenting). 
 81 See Gershowitz, supra note 65, at 45–49 (outlining the flaws of an all-or-nothing method-
ology); infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text (illustrating how a middle-ground approach 
avoids these flaws). 
 82 See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 12 (explaining the need for an appropriate Fourth Amendment rule 
to be clear as well as consistent with constitutional rights); see also Beutler, supra note 65, at 401 
(proposing a broader test that distinguishes between computer-like and traditional cell phone func-
tions); infra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
 83 Gershowitz, supra note 65, at 56 (distinguishing between information on a cell phone and 
information in a cell phone); see also Beutler, supra note 65, at 400–01 (comparing these ad-
vanced phone functions to computer capabilities and arguing for their increased privacy expecta-
tions); id. at 401–02 (concluding that text messages are similar enough to pager messages that they 
should be similarly searchable). 
 84 See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Wurie, No. 13-212, 
2013 WL4402108, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2014). 
 85 Compare Beutler, supra note 65, at 399 (calling rules unworkable when they call for difficult 
tasks for police in categorizing cell phones in legal categories prior to a search), with Jim Martin, 
How to Turn Off 3G and Mobile Data on an iPhone, TECHADVISOR (May 16, 2013), 
http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/how-to/mobile-phone/3276632/how-turn-off-3g-data-on-iphone/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/R8LE-KK9H (illustrating that disabling a phone’s Internet access reveals 
which applications require online functionality). See generally Wurie, 728 F.3d at 12 (concluding that 
a bright-line rule regarding cell phone searches is necessary to avoid fact-specific and subjective rules 
that would be difficult for officers in the field to apply). 
 86 See Martin, supra note 85; see also Disable the Internet Connection on Your Smartphone, 
KIOSKEA.NET (Jan. 2013), http://en.kioskea.net/faq/7399-disable-the-internet-connection-on-your-
smartphone, archived at http://perma.cc/E4Y4-MHGK (providing instructions on how to disable 
cell phone internet access). 
 87 See Snyder, supra note 57, at 162, 164 (illustrating that the kinds of information protected 
by this Comment’s approach, e.g., information that can be accessed only through the Internet, 
yield greater privacy concerns for arrestees). 
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protects thousands of pages of electronic data that would otherwise be out-
side its reach.88 Finally, this test does not suffer from serious evidentiary 
concerns.89 For example, information requiring Internet access—such as the 
type of information that would be protected from a search-incident-to-arrest 
under this approach—is typically not downloaded onto the phone and 
would thus survive a remote wiping.90 
Moreover, the Supreme Court should adopt the Internet test because it 
overcomes many drawbacks that are present in other approaches.91 The test 
treats cell phones in a way that is consistent with how people use them in 
reality, rather than grouping them into poorly fitting legal categorizations or 
legal fictions.92 Furthermore, it takes into account the different types of in-
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Beutler, supra note 65, at 401 (explaining that basic information on cell phones, such as 
address books and call lists, are similar to items that have traditionally been subject to searches 
incident to arrest, whereas more advanced functions, such as e-mail and Internet access, are ac-
companied by higher expectations of privacy in other settings). The features that fall outside of the 
Internet’s scope either involve minimal privacy concerns or are similar to the other types of infor-
mation that courts have allowed, such as address books, contacts, call logs, and phone numbers. 
Id.; see Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that there is no expectation of pri-
vacy in phone numbers dialed); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) 
(“The expectation of privacy in an electronic repository for personal data is . . . analogous to that 
in a personal address book or other repository for such information.”). The features protected 
against a search under this approach are those that have been traditionally protected by courts both 
recently and in the past. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014) (No. 13-186) (explaining that private materials 
maintain their expectation of privacy even though in digital form); United States v. Warshak, 631 
F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that there is an expectation of privacy in the contents of an 
e-mail). 
 89 See Gershowitz, supra note 65, at 56 (explaining that the web-based information on a cell 
phone is not strictly located on the phone, but instead “float[s] around on electronic servers in 
cyberspace”). See generally Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 808 (describing the evidentiary threats to 
information stored on cell phones, such as remote wiping). 
 90 See Gershowitz, supra note 65, at 56. See generally Lendino, supra note 49 (listing the 
various methods for disabling smartphones remotely). 
 91 See Gershowitz, supra note 65, at 45–49 (highlighting problems that arise from the courts’ 
various all-or-nothing solutions); infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text; see also Wurie, 2013 
WL4402108, at *1. 
 92 Compare Robinson, 414 U.S. passim (crafting a modern analysis of the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine without mentioning the necessity or sufficiency of classifying a searched item as a 
container), and Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954 (concluding that the traditional definition of container 
includes only objects that are capable of holding other objects), with Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (cate-
gorizing cell phones as containers to help justify the automatic application of the search-incident-
to-arrest exception). Compare Yanqing Cui et al., supra note 71, at 483, 491 (illustrating that most 
men and women carry their cell phones on their person, whether in trousers or bags), with Park, 
2007 WL 1521573, at *12 (classifying cell phones as “in the arrestee’s immediate area” rather 
than “on their person” to take advantage of the different analysis that comes with the distinction). 
See generally Jana L. Knott, Is There an App for That? Reexamining the Doctrine of Search Inci-
dent to Lawful Arrest in the Context of Cell Phones, 35 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 445, 480 (2010) (con-
cluding that rationalizing searches based on legal fictions is unacceptable); Snyder, supra note 57, 
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formation on a phone and the different levels of privacy associated with the 
information.93 Finally, this test is applicable to all cell phone types, as it 
addresses the particular functions of each phone, rather than the type of 
phone.94 
CONCLUSION 
The First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wurie is the latest chapter 
in a long debate amongst courts about whether the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception should be extended to cover the warrantless searches of cell 
phones. Thus far, courts have split between two extremes, albeit grounding 
their decisions in varying rationales. Each of these approaches has serious 
flaws that weaken its constitutionality or usefulness in the field. Despite the 
courts’ failure to recognize them, nuanced solutions are both permissible and 
more effective. The U.S. Supreme Court should thus reject both extremes and 
adopt a bright-line Internet test that limits warrantless cell phone searches to 
only what can be accessed without the Internet. This test would effectively 
allow the police to view only information that is traditionally searchable inci-
dent to arrest, while preventing them from searching extremely private infor-
mation. Importantly, this test is easy for police to follow in the field and as-
suages the privacy concerns of arrestees. 
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at 183 (concluding that cell phone technology has evolved to the point that courts should not 
maintain legal fictions and categorize phones alongside address books and pagers). 
 93 See Gershowitz, supra note 65, at 57 (arguing that information stored on the phone is akin 
to address books and other searchable items, whereas information acquired via the Internet is 
much more private, such as medical records); Orso, supra note 65, at 187 (highlighting the differ-
ent expectations of privacy between different types of information on a phone); Beutler, supra 
note 65, at 401 (describing that an appropriate rule should take the different functions of a cell 
phone into account). 
 94 See Orso, supra note 69, at 223 (describing conventional phones as still requiring workable 
standards because of their capability of storing large amounts of personal data); Beutler, supra 
note 65, at 401 (concluding that keeping the same rule for conventional phones and smartphones 
makes it simpler for police). 
  
 
